Creativity and ease of ambiguous figural reversal by Wiseman, Richard et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Creativity and ease of ambiguous figural reversal
Citation for published version:
Wiseman, R, Watt, C, Gilhooly, K & Georgiou, G 2011, 'Creativity and ease of ambiguous figural reversal'
British Journal of Psychology, vol. 102, no. 3, pp. 615-622. DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8295.2011.02031.x
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/j.2044-8295.2011.02031.x
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
British Journal of Psychology
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
Wiseman, R., Watt, C., Gilhooly, K., & Georgiou, G. (2011). Creativity and 
ease of ambiguous figural reversal. British Journal of Psychology, 102, 
615-622. 
 
 
 
Creativity and Ease of Ambiguous Figural Reversal  
 
Abstract 
 
Two studies examined the relationships between self-rated and objectively-measured 
creative ability and ease of perceiving alternative interpretations of the ambiguous 
Duck-Rabbit figure. The studies found empirical support for what has previously been 
a largely analogical connection between figural reversal and creativity, using both 
self-rated trait creativity and objectively scored creative productivity. We discuss the 
hypothesis that executive functioning is the likely common cognitive factor linking 
perception of ambiguous figures and creative ability. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Creative thinking results in novel and useful combinations of already-known mental 
elements (Batey & Furnham, 2008), such as representations of concepts, objects, and 
actions. Perceptual restructuring (i.e., seeing patterns in new ways) and conceptual 
restructuring (understanding situations in different ways) are two principal ways that 
novel ideas may arise. How useful novel combinations are generated through 
perceptual and conceptual restructuring is the key question for understanding 
creativity.   It has often been noted that creative ideas seem to occur suddenly, after a 
period of impasse (Ohlsson, 1992; Metcalfe & Weibe, 1987) and that the 
phenomenology of having a creative idea is similar to that of suddenly seeing an 
ambiguous figure in a new way (Schooler & Melcher, 1995).  
 
Thus, clues to understanding conceptual restructuring may come from the similarity 
between the sudden realisation of a creative idea in consciousness and the sudden 
perceptual restructuring that occurs when people study ambiguous figures (Schooler 
& Melcher, 1995). The well-known Necker cube and the Duck-Rabbit figure 
(Jastrow, 1899) are examples of ambiguous reversible figures that typically generate 
alternative and indeed alternating structures. In the Necker cube, perception alternates 
between a cube with the leading face to the right or left and in the Duck-Rabbit, 
perception alternates between a duck facing one way and a rabbit facing the other (see 
Figures 1 and 2 below).  
 
 <Figs 1 and 2 about here.>   
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Turning to possible links between perceptual and conceptual restructuring and 
creativity, Gestalt problem solving theorists, such as Duncker (1945) and Köhler 
(1948), drew explicit analogies between creative problem solving and figural 
reversals in perception. As Ellen (1982, p.324) noted, the appearance of creative 
solutions: 
was akin to what occurs in the process of experiencing a figure-ground 
reversal (Maier, 1930). The perception is sudden, the subject is unaware of 
an intermediate stage, and there is a change in the meaning of the elements of 
the problem. Elements at one moment are seen as one unity: at the next 
moment, another unity appears with the same elements. In short, the Gestalt 
view of problem solving places it in the category of a perceptual experience 
rather than in the general framework of learning and memory phenomena.  
 
The question arises as to whether there is a general ability to re-structure mental 
representations that underlies both perceptual and conceptual restructuring. If this is 
so, we would expect to find correlations between measures of perceptual restructuring 
and of conceptual restructuring. 
Some support for the view that perceptual and conceptual restructuring are 
linked was reported by Schooler and Melcher (1995) who found a significant 
correlation between creative insight problem solving (conceptual restructuring) and a 
measure of perceptual restructuring based on the ease with which participants 
recognised an out of focus picture (Bruner & Potter, 1964). The out of focus picture 
tasks produce sudden shifts in perceptual organisation from having no idea what the 
object is to complete certainty. 
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In the area of creativity, some studies have reported relationships between self-
rated trait creativity and rates of ambiguous figure reversal (Bergum & Bergum, 
1979a,b). However, these findings were not replicated by Simpson et al. (1983) in a 
study examining figure reversal rates and both self-rated and instructor-rated trait 
creativity. Bergum and Flamm (1975) found a non-significant positive trend between 
figure reversal rates and trait creativity scores, derived from biographical and 
adjective checklist forms. The null results arose from studies with small Ns and so 
may be due to low statistical power. Riquelme (2002) found a significant relationship 
between performance on a visuo-spatial creative synthesis task (Finke & Slayton, 
1988) and ease of detecting ambiguous figure reversals.   
 The present paper reports studies that focus on the possible link between 
perceptual restructuring and creativity. The studies reported here have substantial Ns 
to ensure reasonable power. Study 1 employed self-rated trait creativity as did 
previous studies in the area. Study 2 used objective measures of creative production 
from Alternative Uses Tasks (Guilford, Christensen, Merrifield, & Wilson, 1978) and 
so examined links between perceptual restructuring and measurable creative 
performance.  
 
2.1  Study 1 Method  
 
2.1.1  Participants 
 
A volunteer panel was emailed an invitation to take part in an online study. The panel 
consisted of members of the public who had previously expressed an interest in 
participating in studies conducted by the first author. 593 individuals participated 
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(57% male, 43% female); they were not compensated for taking part. The ages and 
nationality of participants were not recorded. 
 
 
2.1.2  Procedure 
 
Participants were shown the Duck-Rabbit image. They were informed that it was an 
ambiguous figure, and that it could be viewed as a duck or a rabbit. They were asked 
to indicate which animal they first saw (response options – ‘duck’, ‘rabbit’); how easy 
they found it to see the opposite animal to the one they first saw (‘very easily’, 
‘easily’, ‘not at all easily’, ‘cannot see the other animal’); and whether they would 
describe themselves as artistically creative, and as a creative problem-solver 
(‘definitely yes’, ‘yes’, ‘uncertain’, ‘no’, ‘definitely no’).  Participants were also 
asked to indicate whether they had seen the ‘Duck-Rabbit’ image before (‘yes’, ‘no’). 
 
2.2  Study 1 Results and Discussion  
 
Just over half of the participants (54.6%) reported that they had seen the Duck-Rabbit 
image before the study. The majority (85.83%) of participants reported seeing the 
duck first.  There was no relationship between which animal was first seen and self-
rated artistic creativity or self-rated creative problem solving (Artistically Creative: 
Spearman’s rho (corrected for ties) = 0.05, Z = 1.20, p(two-tailed) = 0.23: Creative 
Problem Solver: Spearman’s rho (corrected for ties) = 0.05, Z = 1.15, p(two-tailed) = 
0.25.  There was also no relationship between whether they had seen the ‘Duck-
Rabbit’ image before the study and self-rated artistic creativity or self-rated creative 
problem solving (Artistically Creative: Spearman’s rho (corrected for ties) = 0.01, Z = 
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0.30, p(two-tailed) = 0.76: Creative Problem Solver: Spearman’s rho (corrected for 
ties) = -0.03, Z = -0.76, p(two-tailed) = 0.45). 
There were, however, strong relationships between self-rated creativity and the 
ease of perceiving the two animals in the image (see Table 1: Artistically Creative: 
Spearman’s rho (corrected for ties) = 0.17; Z = 4.26, p(two-tailed) < 0.0001; Creative 
Problem Solver: Spearman’s rho (corrected for ties) = 0.17, Z = 4.04, p(two-tailed) < 
0.0001).   As predicted, those who described themselves as more creative reported 
finding it easier to flip between the two interpretations of the image. 
 
<Insert Table 1 around here> 
 
The results of this study are consistent with previous results relating self-judged 
trait creativity to figural reversal (Bergum & Bergum, 1979a,b) and it may be 
suggested that previous failures to replicate these findings (Simpson et al., 1983, and 
Bergum & Flamm, 1975) were due to lack of power in those studies as compared to 
the present Study 1.  
However, Study 1 relied on self-report measures of creativity. This does not 
enable us to rule out the possibility that the significant relationships that emerged 
were due to participants’ response biases, such as giving a socially-desirable response, 
and may not reflect a real link between creative performance and figural reversal. 
Study 2 therefore used performance on a standard creative problem-solving task as 
the dependent variable to be predicted by ease of figural reversal. 
 
3.1  Study 2 Method  
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3.1.1  Participants 
 
Participants were 93 prospective undergraduate psychology students and their parents 
attending a talk during a University Open Day (27% male, 73% female); they were 
not compensated for taking part. The ages and nationality of participants were not 
recorded. 
 
3.1.2.  Procedure 
 
Participants were shown the duck-rabbit image for approximately 30 seconds. 
 
They were informed that it was an ambiguous figure, and that it could be viewed as a 
duck or a rabbit.  They were then given a few minutes to complete the questionnaire, 
indicating: which animal they first saw (response options – ‘duck’, ‘rabbit’); and how 
easy they found it to see the opposite animal to the one they first saw (‘very easily’, 
‘easily’, ‘not at all easily’, ‘cannot see the other animal’).  They were then asked to 
complete one of two shortened versions of Guilford’s Alternative Uses Task (Guilford 
et al., 1978) where they were asked to list as many possible uses for either a brick or a 
paperclip.  Participants were given the following instructions: “In a moment, I would 
like you to list as many different uses as you can think of for a common object. For 
example, the normal use for a newspaper is for reading, but it can also be used for 
swatting flies, to line drawers, to make a paper hat, and so on. You will be told how 
the object is normally used but you are to try and produce as many possible uses that 
are different from the object’s normal use and uses that are different to each other. 
Please write down as many uses as you can until asked to stop.” 
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The two versions of the questionnaire were distributed amongst the audience so 
that adjacent participants’ responses would be independent.  
 
3.2  Study 2 Results and Discussion  
 
3.2.1  Task scoring 
 
To avoid possible scoring bias, the alternate uses listed during the creative problem-
solving task were scored blind to participants’ responses to the question about ease of 
seeing the opposite animal. As the instructions were for participants to strive to list as 
many different and novel uses for the objects as they could, responses that were not 
different from the normal use for the objects received no points. The decision on what 
was a novel use was based on the function for which the object was originally 
designed. For example, the brick was designed for construction so the response 
‘building a wall’ for the brick was not novel. Each novel and different response (e.g., 
‘a footrest’ ‘a device to save water in toilet cisterns’ for the brick) was given a point. 
Multiple novel but similar responses were combined and given just a single point. A 
response was judged as similar if it fell into the same functional category. For 
example ‘a ring’ and ‘an earring’ for the paperclip both fall into the category 
jewellery, so would be assigned only one point. Therefore no single listed item could 
receive more than one point. These points were summed to provide a single score for 
each participant. The resulting score is essentially an indicator of flexibility “…with 
respect to the variety of perspectives represented in the ideas.” (Plucker & Renziller, 
1993, p.39).  Two raters scored the questionnaires independently.  Inter-rater 
9 
 
reliability was very high (Pearson’s r = .93) so the results were based on the scoring 
of the first rater. 
 
Just over one quarter (26.6%) of participants indicated that they had seen the 
Duck-Rabbit image before the study. 94% of participants reported seeing the duck 
first.  There was no relationship between which animal was first seen and scores on 
the creativity test: Spearman’s rho (corrected for ties) = -0.01, Z = -0.14,  p(two-
tailed) = 0.89). 
 
Table 2 shows the average number of unusual alternate uses produced by 
participants, categorised into groups according to the ease with which they reported 
they could see the opposite animal in the ambiguous figure. There was again a clear 
relationship, with those participants who said they found it difficult to see the 
opposite animal coming up with significantly fewer alternate uses than those who 
could easily see the opposite animal (Spearman’s rho (corrected for ties) = 0.28, Z = 
2.70, p(two-tailed) = 0.007).  Post hoc testing showed that those in the ‘very easy’ 
group produced significantly more uses than those in both the ‘easy’ (Fisher PLSD = 
.96) and ‘I cannot see it’ (Fisher PLSD = .2.25) groups.  None of the comparisons 
between the other groups reached significance.    
 
<Insert Table 2 about here.> 
 
The results of Study 2 strongly indicate that production of unusual uses for 
familiar objects is linked to ease of figural reversal. The results are consistent with 
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Riquelme’s (2002) observation that production of unusual figures from component 
shapes was related to figural reversal ability.   
 
4.  General Discussion  
 
The present studies found empirical support for what has previously been a largely 
analogical connection between figural reversal and creativity, using both self-rated 
trait creativity and objectively scored creative productivity. What could be the basis of 
this relationship? 
Gestalt approaches to creative problem solving stressed the role of spontaneous 
restructuring of the solver’s understanding and perception of the problem materials. In 
the Gestalt view, both restructuring in creative tasks and in figural reversal is 
automatic, and cannot be controlled by the solver. This contrasts with the more recent 
information processing view that restructuring in insight tasks requires conscious 
application of heuristics to explore alternative ways of conceptualising the materials 
(Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Fleck & Weisberg, 2004; Gilhooly & Murphy, 2005; 
Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009). 
Recent research on perception of ambiguous figures suggests that, counter to the 
Gestalt approach, executive functions are involved in perceiving alternative 
interpretations of ambiguous figures. Developmental studies have found that young 
children do not generally perceive alternatives in the Duck-Rabbit image until 5 years 
of age (Rock, Gopnik & Hall, 1994). Doherty and Wimmer (2005) and Bialystok and 
Shapero (2005) relate the development of ambiguity perception in the Duck-Rabbit 
type of figure to the development of executive functions that can inhibit initial 
interpretations and engage attentional control to scan the figure and to prompt 
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different interpretations. Doherty and Wimmer (2005) also implicate the development 
of imagery ability as a factor.  
The role of executive processes in creative divergent thinking has been 
supported by Gilhooly et al. (2007) in a think aloud protocol analysis study that 
implicated effortful strategies such as imagining the object being disassembled or 
scanning images of the object to detect attributes that would then evoke or cue uses. A 
second study (Gilhooly et al., 2007) found direct correlations between efficiency 
measures of the executive function of switching and the novelty of alternative uses 
generated. In the case of creative insight tasks, Fleck & Weisberg (2004) again found 
evidence from think aloud data of conscious executively controlled strategies. 
Gilhooly & Murphy (2005) in a correlational study found that creative insight 
problem solving was significantly linked to measures of the executive functions of 
inhibition and switching. 
The studies reported in this paper do have some limitations. Although our 
findings are consistent with an executive control account of creativity and figural 
reversal, the present studies are unable to rule out the alternative interpretation that 
either general intelligence or spatial ability is the common factor underlying both 
creativity and figural reversal. It thus remains for future research to address this issue. 
Also, the present studies may have introduced a bias by not counter-balancing the 
order of presentation of the response options to the question of which animal is seen 
first. Further, the method of data collection in the present studies (group testing in 
study 1, online testing in study 2) made it more expedient to use self-report measures 
of ease of figural reversal. This is particularly a weakness for study 1, which 
correlated self-reported ease of figural reversal with self-rated creativity. 
Additionally, as single item measures of creativity were used in study 1, the reliability 
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of these measures cannot be assessed. Objective measures of figural reversal, such as 
time to first reversal, would be preferable for future studies.  
Overall, it seems plausible that the common factor underlying figural reversal 
and creativity is executive control, that has been shown to be important in both task 
areas. Although this conclusion is counter to the classical Gestalt account, which 
stresses spontaneous, uncontrolled processes as underlying both conceptual insight 
and perceptual restructuring, we may note that even the executive function account 
still includes a degree of automatic processing. For example, in the Alternative Uses 
Task the participant may executively decide to scan the brick image and its roughness 
may be noted and evoke a use of scraping a surface of chewing gum; however,  which 
features are noticed first and what uses are evoked by those features seem to be based 
on automatic processes. A similar mix of top down (executive) and bottom-up 
processes seems to be involved in duck-rabbit reversal. If attention is focussed on one 
side a rabbit interpretation is automatically retrieved and if the attentional focus 
moves to the other side a duck interpretation is automatically generated. The role of 
executive processes may be clarified in future research through inclusion of measures 
of executive functioning. 
Finally, we may note that three types of ambiguous figures have been identified 
(Long & Toppino, 1981) viz., figure-ground reversals (such as vases-faces), 
perspective reversals (such as Necker cube) and meaning-content reversals (such as 
the Duck-Rabbit). Our present studies used only one meaning-content reversal figure 
and it would be interesting for future work to repeat Studies 1 and 2 with figure-
ground and perspective reversals that may involve different mixtures of top-down and 
bottom-up processing and so have different linkages to creative thinking.    
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 Artistically creative 
 Definitely 
Yes 
Yes Uncertain No Definitely 
No 
Very easily 23.60 
(97) 
34.79 
(143) 
16.06 
(66) 
22.38 
(92) 
3.16 
(13) 
Easily 13.19 
(19) 
27.78 
(40) 
22.92 
(33) 
30.56 
(44) 
5.56 
(8) 
Not at all 
easily 
19.35 
(6) 
16.13 
(5) 
16.13 
(5) 
29.05 
(9) 
19.35 
(6) 
I cannot see 
it 
0 
(0) 
42.86 
(3) 
28.57 
(2) 
28.57 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
 Creative problem-solver 
 Definitely 
Yes 
Yes Uncertain No Definitely 
No 
Very easily 32.12 
(132) 
51.34 
(211) 
14.11 
(58) 
2.43 
(10) 
0 
(0) 
Easily 22.22 
(32) 
54.86 
(79) 
16.67 
(24) 
6.25 
(9) 
0 
(0) 
Not at all 
easily 
9.68 
(3) 
54.84 
(17) 
25.81 
(8) 
3.23 
(1) 
6.45 
(2) 
I cannot see 
it 
0 
(0) 
57.14 
(4) 
42.86 
(3) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
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Table 1: Percentage and numbers (in parentheses) of participants who reported 
that they could ‘very easily’ and ‘easily’ see the opposite animal. 
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 Very 
easily 
N=46 
 
Easily 
 
N=34 
Not at all 
easily 
N=7 
I cannot 
see it 
N=7 
Average 
number of 
alternate 
uses 
4.78 
(2.38) 
3.62 
(1.83) 
3.57 
(2.57) 
1.80 
(.96) 
 
Table 2. Average number of alternate uses (standard deviations in parentheses) 
produced by participants according to the ease of seeing opposite animal.  
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Figure 1: Necker Cube 
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Figure 2: The Jastrow Duck-Rabbit image 
 
 
